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1FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, CAPITAL
FORMATION AND LABOUR COSTS:
EVIDENCE FROM BRITAIN AND GERMANY
J.  HATZIUS
1. INTRODUCTION
If higher labour costs induce firms to relocate production abroad,
domestic employment will fall. In recent years, this has led some
observers to argue that falling barriers to foreign direct investment
(FDI) have made wage moderation more important for preserving
employment. Unless wages are kept under control, the argument
goes, capital will migrate to countries with lower labour costs, and
unemployment will rise. If falling FDI barriers increase the elasticity
of the capital stock with respect to costs, the underlying argument is
perfectly consistent with standard labour demand theory. Hicks
notes in The Theory of Wages that “[t]he demand for anything is
likely to be more elastic, the more elastic is the supply of co-operant
agents of production” (Hicks, 1932, p. 242).
The present paper examines the implications of falling FDI
barriers using data from Germany and Britain. The public perception
of FDI liberalisation differs profoundly in these two countries. In
Germany, it is seen as a threat that will either drive companies out of
the country, or reduce Germany’s high wages and generous social
welfare benefits. By contrast, many British commentators see lower
FDI barriers as an opportunity to attract companies that seek access
to European markets but want to avoid continental “inflexibility”.
Most commentators in both countries take it for granted that labour
costs are a major determinant of FDI, and that falling FDI barriers
make wage moderation more important for keeping investment and
jobs at home.
Britain’s FDI inflows of around 2% of GDP, as well as its share
of over 40% of all EU inward FDI (Eurostat, 1994), are among the
British government’s favourite statistics and have encouraged it to
2portray Britain as the “enterprise centre of Europe”. FDI inflows to
Germany, by contrast, have been below 0.5% of GDP for many
years, causing great concern among policy makers and pundits.
However, it is less often realised that outflows are also much higher
in Britain (about 3% of GDP) than in Germany (about 1.5%) so that
net FDI outflows are rather similar in the two countries (see OECD,
1995). Hence, Britain’s higher inflows may simply reflect a different
industrial structure, with a greater role for multinationals, rather than
more attractive locational conditions.
Most policy debates take it for granted that FDI translates
straight into physical investment.i It is therefore interesting to see
what has happened to capital formation in Britain and Germany.
While the aggregate investment rate is substantially lower in Britain
than in Germany, manufacturing investment, which may be more
relevant to the relocation debate, is quite similar (Bond and
Jenkinson, 1996; see also Table 6). Both countries have seen their
investment rates fall considerably since the early 1970s, but their
relative positions have remained quite stable. These facts do not
suggest that high costs have hurt capital formation in Germany as
compared to Britain. Instead, it seems that if high costs have
contributed to falling investment, both countries were affected in
similar measure.
Globally, FDI has grown dramatically since the early 1980s.
The combined annual outflows from OECD countries (including
flows within the OECD) have increased from less than $30 billion
before 1983 to over $160 billion in every year since 1988. It seems
clear that deregulation has played its part in this process. The United
Nations Transnational Corporations Division (UNTCD, 1993) finds
that with the abolition of exchange controls in Europe during the
1980s, outward FDI is essentially only subject to market forces.
Some controls on inward FDI remain in various countries, but the
liberalisation trend that “began in the mid-1970s has continued
through the 1980s and early 1990s” (UNTCD, 1993, p. 17). In
addition, trade restrictions have fallen, through both GATT and
regional institutions such as the European Community. The impact
on FDI is theoretically ambiguous. Falling trade costs increase
3“vertical” FDI, which is driven by production cost considerations,
but reduce “horizontal” FDI, which is motivated by market access
(Markusen et al., 1996).
How do the elasticities of investment and labour demand relate
to the level of FDI barriers? Under perfect markets and capital
mobility, the capital stock of a small country is infinitely elastic with
respect to the domestic rate of return. If unit labour costs are
negatively related to the domestic rate of return, as is likely, they
will be completely determined by the world rate of return. Hence,
the supply of capital is infinitely elastic with respect to unit labour
costs. This simple argument mirrors the well-known factor price
equalisation (FPE) theorem of international trade theory, which
states that factor prices are completely determined by world product
prices under free trade, so that the labour demand curve is perfectly
elastic. In reality, FPE is unlikely to hold exactly. However, while
the labour demand elasticity will remain finite under market
imperfections such as monopolistic competition or transport costs, it
will nevertheless increase following trade or investment
liberalisation (see Wes, 1996).
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In an open economy, rising labour costs tend to reduce labour
demand for three reasons. First, the typical firm produces less total
output in response to higher unit costs (the output or scale effect).
Second, capital is substituted for labour (the substitution effect).
And third, some firms may move abroad (the location effect). The
theoretical appendix provides a very simple example in which the
location effect becomes larger as the barriers to FDI fall. The output
and substitution effects, which are less likely to be affected by
“globalisation”, are neglected for simplicity in this example.
The idea underlying the model is as follows. Firms incur “FDI
costs”, or costs of producing abroad. The average level of FDI
barriers is determined by policy. However, firm-specific FDI barriers
4vary with a number of factors specific to the home and destination
countries, the industry, and the firm itself. These include the
similarity of labour force skills between countries, industry-specific
barriers to foreign activity such as national ownership requirements,
or the capability of managers to oversee foreign operations.
5With high FDI barriers, a given small change in production
costs will push only a small number of firms to relocate (because the
density of the distribution is very low around the critical point). As
FDI barriers fall, however, the same cost change will induce more
firms to move (because the density of the distribution at the critical
point is higher). Hence, the elasticity of the capital stock and labour
demand with respect to production costs rises as relocation costs
fall. The graphic analysis in the Appendix uses the example of a firm
that must decide whether to produce at home or abroad to serve its
home market. Similar results hold for export production. In fact, it
turns out that falling FDI barriers increase the total location effect
whenever initial average FDI barriers are sufficiently high relative to
transport costs. Hence, a partial dismantling of high FDI barriers
under relatively free trade will increase the effect of unit costs on
labour demand. In the last thirty years, this has arguably been the
relevant case for most industrial economies.
3. EVIDENCE: FOREIGN INVESTMENT
3.1 Approach and Specification
The effect of unit labour costs on British and German bilateral FDI
flows is estimated from a simple equation relating foreign investment
to unit labour costs and other control variables. Such an equation is
standard in the literature on the determinants of FDI.ii
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where FDI denotes FDI flows as a percentage of partner-country
GDP; w, pr, and e denote labour costs, labour productivity, and the
exchange rate; the subscripts i, j, and t denote the source country,
the destination country, and time; X denotes other control variables
that may influence FDI; and e  denotes an i. i. d. error term. Details
6on the construction of the two data sets are given in the data
appendix.
The dependent variable is based on aggregate bilateral flows
between Britain or Germany, and the partner country. The British
data set is made up of aggregate manufacturing data. Relocating
production for a given market requires that the product be
transportable, so that manufacturing data are likely to be better
suited to the analysis. The dependent variable is defined as the real
annual flow of FDI, adjusted for exchange-rate fluctuations and
divided by partner-country manufacturing value added.
Unfortunately, German bilateral manufacturing FDI data were
unavailable for a sufficiently long time period. Hence, aggregate data
are used for both the dependent and the explanatory variables.
However, there is a choice of dependent variable since the
Bundesbank provides both annual flow and stock data (stock data
are only available on a three-yearly basis for Britain). The latter can
be deflated and first-differenced to obtain a pseudo-flow, which
should correspond roughly to the flow figures since I adjust for
exchange rate fluctuations and both measures are supposed to
include retained earnings. But in practice, the change in the real FDI
stock usually exceeds the real FDI flow by a substantial amount,
particularly in the case of inflows (see Figures 2 and 3). The
procyclical pattern of this difference suggests that the flow data may
pick up retained earnings only imperfectly. Also, there may be
procyclical valuation adjustments to the stock data, although this
explanation begs the question why differenced stocks exceed flows
even in a recession.
In both data sets, the main explanatory variable is log relative
unit labour cost at market exchange rates, defined as the log annual
labour cost difference minus the trend productivity difference
between source and destination country. The idea is that high labour
costs will only be detrimental to investment if they are not matched
by high labour productivity. Unit labour costs are assumed to be
exogenous to foreign investment decisions. It is possible to think of
situations in which this condition is violated. First, net FDI inflows
may appreciate the currency and thus raise relative unit labour costs.
7Second, net FDI inflows may expand employment, increasing wage
pressure and unit labour costs. However, it should be noted that
bilateral FDI flows are very small, given that total inward plus
outward FDI flows are typically less than 10% of British
manufacturing output, and less than 2% of German GDP. Hence, it is
unlikely that bilateral FDI flows have a sufficiently large effect on
economy-wide (or in the British case, manufacturing-wide)
aggregates such as unit labour costs and the exchange rate to bias the
coefficients seriously. Since the effect of net FDI inflows on unit
labour costs, if one exists, is likely to be positive, any simultaneity
bias will be towards zero and will cause an understatement of the
true effect of labour costs on FDI.iii
One other variable that turns out to be important in the case of
Germany (but not Britain) is a dummy denoting European
Community (EC) membership. It is entered both on its own and
interacted with the labour cost variable, to test the hypothesis that
EC membership may not only raise FDI flows per se, but also
facilitate cost-induced relocation and thus reinforce the effect of
labour costs. For instance, the absence of trade barriers within the
EC should make it easier for firms to locate the production of
intermediate goods on the basis of relative cost levels.
Other control variables are included in some equations to test
the robustness of the basic results. For instance, the deviation of
output from trend in the source and destination country is intended
to control for short-term business cycle fluctuations; the relative
number of days lost to strikes and lockouts to control for the
industrial relations climate; and the relative real long-term interest
rate to control for differences in the return to financial assets across
countries. In addition, I always include time dummies to control for
unobserved factors that drive the international propensity to invest
abroad and may be partly responsible for the FDI surge in the late
1980s. Time dummies are conceptually important because the point
of the econometric equations is to estimate the effect of unit labour
costs for a given level of FDI barriers. (In practice, however, no
qualitative results hinge on the inclusion of time dummies). In
addition, most equations contain country or bilateral dummies.
8Country dummies control for fixed characteristics that affect both
inflows and outflows in the same direction, such as distance.
Bilateral dummies, which are less restrictive and are sometimes used
instead of country dummies, control for fixed characteristics that
may affect only one flow, such as one-way barriers to FDI inflows.
Note that bilateral dummies eliminate all cross-sectional information
from the analysis.
3.2 Results
Patterns
The best way to start is to look at the raw data. Tables 1 and 2
present average relative bilateral FDI flows and unit labour cost
differences between Britain or Germany and the partner country.
Starting with Britain in Table 1, a large group of countries have
average unit labour costs within a 10% range of the UK. Most of
these have received net FDI flows from the UK during the sample
period. However, looking at the outliers reveals quite a striking
correlation between high unit labour costs and net FDI outflows.
The UK sees substantial net inflows from the two countries with the
highest unit labour costs, Denmark and Sweden. By contrast, UK
outflows to Australia, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain – all
countries with low unit labour costs – are typically large, while no
complete FDI inflow series is available for these countries. This lack
of data reflects the practice of the Central Statistical Office to
suppress FDI data if the number of investors is too small to ensure
anonymity, and is therefore in itself evidence of small inflows.
Hence, high unit labour costs seem to be associated with net FDI
outflows.
Table 2 repeats the exercise for German bilateral flows and
stock changes. It is clear that both outflows and inflows, but
particularly the latter, are larger on average when measured as a
stock change. This reflects both the usual excess of stock changes
over recorded flows noted above, and the fact that the stock change
is measured only from 1984 onwards and thus leaves out two low-
FDI years. More importantly, however, there is an even stronger
9association between high unit labour costs and net FDI outflows
than in the British data. All countries with lower unit labour costs
than Germany – except the Netherlands when looking at stock
differences – receive net FDI inflows from Germany. By contrast, all
countries with higher unit labour costs – except Switzerland when
looking at the flow data – provide net FDI outflows to Germany.
Incidentally, the raw correlation between high unit labour costs and
net FDI outflows observed in both data sets suggests that unit labour
costs are more likely to cause FDI than the other way around: after
all, there is no obvious reason why FDI outflows should cause unit
labour costs to be high.
Regression Results
The econometric results should be thought of as a test whether the
association of unit labour costs and FDI flows stands up after
controlling for other variables. Table 3 presents the results for FDI in
Britain. The coefficient on relative unit labour costs (RULC) in a
simple regression is over 0.5 if country dummies are included, and is
significant at the 1% level. Columns (2) through (4) show that this
result is essentially robust to the inclusion of other variables such as
EC membership (both on its own and interacted with RULC),
business cycle factors, an industrial relations variable and real
interest rates. Moreover, none of these additional variables are
significant after controlling for unit labour costs.iv However, note
that introducing bilateral dummies in columns (5) through (7)
reduces the RULC coefficient to about 0.3 and make it insignificant
at all conventional levels. Bilateral dummies eliminate all cross-
sectional information – that is, the entire content of Table 1 – from
the analysis.
Tables 4 and 5 contain analogous results for Germany, for the
flow and differenced stock data respectively. Broadly speaking, the
results are similar to those for Britain. However, unit labour costs are
only significant within the EC. This may indicate that German
multinationals (and foreign firms with subsidiaries in Germany)
engage in cost-induced relocation mainly within Europe, while their
British counterparts seek low-cost production locations worldwide.
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Within the EC, the coefficient on unit labour costs is about 0.3 for
the flow data and 0.7 for the stock data, and it is typically significant
at the 1% level. These estimates remain broadly the same when
bilateral dummies are included, but rising standard errors make all
estimates insignificant at conventional levels. Nevertheless, it is
noteworthy that the predicted effect of unit labour costs on FDI
remains basically the same when all cross-sectional information –
that is, the entire content of Table 2 – is eliminated.
The estimates are much larger in Table 4 than in Table 5. This
is not surprising in the light of Figures 1 and 2, where FDI stock
differences look like a magnified FDI flow series (at least as far as
inflows to Germany are concerned). Again, a possible reason for the
diverging estimates is that retained earnings, which are presumably
lower when unit labour costs are high, may only be imperfectly
captured in the flow data.
All the regressions in Tables 3 to 5 assume that a 1% increase
in real domestic unit labour costs has the same effect as a 1% fall in
the real exchange rate. This restriction is accepted at the 10% level
of significance in all cases. Similarly, the symmetry restriction that
unit labour costs in the source and destination county have equal
and opposite effects is always accepted at the 10% level. Hence, the
relative unit labour cost specification is consistent with the data. The
additional regressions are available on request.
Note that the adjusted R2 is quite low in all regressions; in fact,
even if bilateral and time dummies are included, it never exceeds 0.3.
This means that only a small part of the variation in FDI flows is
“explained” by the independent variables. The main reason is that
bilateral FDI data are very “lumpy” as the number of transactions in
each year is quite small. However, my interest lies not in
“explaining” the variation in FDI, much of which is presumably due
to firm-specific factors hard to capture in an aggregate equation, but
rather in the “conditional expectation function”, or the expected
effect of variations in unit labour costs on FDI (see Goldberger,
1991, p. 177f.). For this purpose, the low R2 is irrelevant.
Overall, the results clearly support a positive effect of unit
labour costs on FDI outflows. This effect becomes insignificant when
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bilateral dummies are introduced. However, the resulting loss of
information as compared to the inclusion of only country dummies –
which also control for characteristics such as distance and other FDI
barriers affecting both flows – is very substantial. In any case, the
bilateral-dummy results provide no evidence that the basic results
are biased by the use of cross-sectional information.
Implications
What are the quantitative implications of the results in Tables 3 to
5? Starting with the British estimates (those that include country
dummies), we calculate the predicted effect of a 1% increase in
British unit labour costs on net FDI inflows in 1993. Total
manufacturing value-added (at 1985 prices) was equal to about
£1,350 billion in all destination countries for UK multinationals in
the data set, and about £1,173 billion in all home countries of
multinationals with UK subsidiaries. Using the coefficient in column
(2) of Table 3 of 0.54, a 1% increase in British unit labour costs
would be expected to increase annual UK outflows by £74 million,
and reduce inflows by £65 million. Hence, net UK FDI inflows fall
by £139 million, or 1.7% of Britain’s 1993 manufacturing
investment (CSO, 1996).
We can calculate the predicted effect for Germany in a similar
manner using the range of estimates of 0.3 to 0.7. A significant effect
is found only within the EC in column (3) of Tables 4 and 5. In
1993, the combined GDP of the EC countries in the sample was DM
12,700 billion (in 1985 prices). The estimates therefore imply that
FDI outflows rise, and inflows fall, by between DM 381 million and
DM 898 million in response to a 1% labour cost increase. Hence,
net FDI inflows fall by between DM 762 million and DM 1,796
million, or between 0.3% and 0.7% of Germany’s aggregate 1993
investment (excluding dwellings) of DM 259 billion (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 1996).
Indeed, the effect for Germany in manufacturing alone may be
similarly strong as in Britain. It is likely that capital relocation is
largely confined to that sector because service industries offer little
12
scope for relocating production away from the point of final sale.
German manufacturing investment was DM 70.7 billion in 1993
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 1996). Under the (extreme) assumption
that the net outflow takes place exclusively in manufacturing, a one-
percent increase in unit labour costs would reduce net
manufacturing FDI inflows by between 1.1% and 2.5% of
manufacturing investment. This range neatly encompasses the
predicted effect in British manufacturing.
What do these results imply for the elasticities of investment
and labour demand with respect to labour costs? To provide an
approximate answer to this question, it is necessary to make some
restrictive assumptions. First, assume that FDI barriers were
prohibitive before the start of the sample period but much lower
afterwards. Second, assume that FDI flows correspond to physical
investment flows. Third, assume that any FDI outflow induced by
higher unit labour costs in the 1980s would have been invested in
the home country in the 1970s. Under these assumptions, the
elasticity of net FDI inflows with respect to unit labour costs
calculated above corresponds to the rise in the domestic investment
elasticity that we should observe (other things equal) between the
1970s and the 1980s. All of these assumptions, but particularly the
last, are likely to lead to an overstatement of the change in the
investment elasticity. There may have been some labour-cost
induced relocation in the 1970s, when FDI barriers were high but
not prohibitive (see UNTCD, 1993); FDI flows may partially reflect
financial flows unrelated to physical investment; and most
importantly, investment relocated in response to higher domestic
costs in the 1980s may have been scrapped rather than undertaken at
home, had FDI barriers been prohibitive.
Hence, FDI liberalisation may have raised the investment
elasticity by 1.7 in British manufacturing and by between 0.3 and
0.7 in the entire German economy, but these estimates should be
seen as an upper bound. Note, however, that the potential
implications for labour demand are substantial since under constant
returns investment, the capital stock and labour demand are all
proportional in the long-run. Hence, an increase in the investment
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elasticity by 1.7 (in the British case) would imply an increase in the
labour demand elasticity by the same amount, which exceeds most
estimates of the total labour demand elasticity estimated from
historical data (see Hamermesh, 1993). Given the importance of such
a change and the restrictive assumptions underlying its calculation,
independent evidence on changes in the investment elasticity is
clearly needed. This is provided in the following section.
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4. EVIDENCE: DOMESTIC INVESTMENT
4.1 Approach and Specification
This section estimates directly whether the effect of labour costs on
domestic manufacturing investment has become more negative
between the low-FDI 1970s and the high-FDI 1980s and, in
particular, whether such a change has taken place in FDI-intensive
industries. The approach is to estimate separate manufacturing
investment equations for the two time periods, and for each of
industry group defined by FDI intensity. Other approaches are
conceivable. First, one may want to estimate the determinants of
domestic and foreign investment jointly. However, the FDI data are
conceptually rather different from the domestic investment data and
are not available for the entire period or at the same level of
industrial disaggregation. Second, one may want to pool all the data
and let only the unit labour cost coefficients vary by sub-period or
industry group. However, it turns out that pooling over time is
statistically rejected in all cases and pooling across industry groups
is rejected in most cases.
The classification of industries in terms of their FDI intensity is
described in the data appendix. Some important differences between
Britain and Germany emerge. For instance, food and beverages are
FDI-intensive in Britain but not in Germany. By contrast, clothing
and engineering industries are FDI-intensive in Germany but not in
Britain. However, chemical industries are consistently among the
most FDI-intensive in both countries.
The investment equations can be thought of as skeleton
versions of those estimated in Denny and Nickell (1992) and Dinenis
and Funke (1994). I regress log investment on normalised log unit
labour costs, an industry-specific demand index, an industry-specific
fixed effect, a lagged dependent variable and, in some cases, an
aggregate time effect. In the calculation of normalised unit labour
costs, labour productivity is defined as the predicted value from a
regression of industry value-added per worker on a cubic trend (the
15
main results are robust to altering this definition). Besides unit
labour costs, all equations contain an industry demand index that
controls for the cyclical behaviour of investment. It is defined as the
deviation of log industry value-added from a cubic trend. This
variable is preferable to total value-added because the trend
component of output is clearly endogenous to investment; in
practice, however, replacing the demand variable by log value-added
does not have a major effect on the unit labour cost results. A lagged
dependent variable allows for sluggish adjustment in investment
rates which has been found important by Dinenis and Funke (1994).
Time dummies control for all aggregate variables that may influence
industry investment, such as aggregate demand, interest rates, the
exchange rate, and possibly “animal spirits”. All equations are
estimated by the least-squares dummy-variable (LSDV) estimator.v
4.2 Results
The regression results are contained in Tables 7 to 14. The most
important pieces of information is given in the row entitled “Sum
ULC”, which shows the total effect of current and lagged unit labour
costs, along with its significance level.
Tables 7 and 8 show the results for the entire sample of
manufacturing industries. In Britain, the effect is insignificant at the
5% level for the 1970s, but significantly negative for the 1980s. The
difference is more pronounced when time dummies are included. In
Germany, the results are stronger: In the 1970s, the estimated total
effect is essentially zero, but in the 1980s it is around minus unity
and significant at the 0.1% level. Hence, the effect of unit labour
costs on investment has become more negative in both countries.
Tables 9 and 10 restrict the samples to low-FDI industries. In
Britain, the unit labour cost effect seems to have become less
negative. While the point estimates are negative in both the 1970s
and the 1980s, they are smaller in absolute terms in the 1980s and
are no longer significant at the 5% level. In Germany, the results are
somewhat more ambiguous. If time dummies are excluded, the effect
16
changes from negative and insignificant in the 1970s to negative,
very large (-2.7) and highly significant in the 1980s. However, if time
dummies are included, the estimates change from negative and
significant at the 5% level to negative, smaller in absolute size and
insignificant at all conventional levels. Hence the large negative
effect of labour costs in the 1980s seems to be driven by an
aggregate correlation between labour costs and investment activity. It
is quite conceivable that this correlation represents a causal
relationship, but one would have more confidence in the estimated
negative effect of labour costs if it held up at the level of the
individual industry when controlling for aggregate factors. Thus, the
effect has become less negative in Britain but may have become
either more or less negative in Germany.
Tables 11 and 12 repeat this exercise for medium-FDI
industries. In Britain, the effect becomes less negative and
insignificant between the two periods if time dummies are excluded,
but becomes much more negative and significant at the 10% level if
time dummies are included. In Germany, the effect is mildly positive
and insignificant in the 1970s, and negative in the 1980s, but only
significant if time dummies are excluded. Overall, the evidence for a
more negative effect in the 1980s is weak.
Finally, Tables 13 and 14 show the results for high-FDI
industries. In Britain, the effect of unit labour costs is roughly zero
in the 1970s. In the 1980s, it is negative and significant at the 5%
level if time dummies are included. In Germany, the results are even
stronger. The effect is around zero in the 1970s but is around minus
unity and significant at the 0.1% level in the 1980s. Hence, the effect
has clearly become more negative in both countries.
Overall, the results support the notion that FDI liberalisation
has made the effect of labour costs on investment more negative. Not
only is there strong evidence that this effect has become more
negative in manufacturing as a whole, but the subsample of high-FDI
industries shows the clearest change in both Britain and Germany.
Are the estimated magnitudes consistent with the FDI results in
the last section? To evaluate the results, let us use the – short-run
and long-run – total effect of unit labour costs in the more robust
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regressions that include time dummies. The long-run effect is found
in the usual way by dividing the “Sum ULC” coefficient by one
minus the autoregressive coefficient. Note that the autoregressive
coefficient is biased downwards so the estimated long-run effect is
biased towards zero (Nickell, 1981). In British manufacturing, the
whole-sample results imply a rise of 0.41 in the short-run and 0.86
in the long-run. Such a change is considerable, though less dramatic
than the calculations of the previous section suggest. If factors other
than FDI openness that potentially influence the investment
elasticity were indeed constant between the 1970s and 1980s, the
British results point to an overstatement of the elasticity change in
the calculations of the last section. In German manufacturing, the
whole-sample results imply a rise by 0.87 in the short-run and 2.60
in the long-run. These estimates are broadly in line with those of the
previous section if most relocation takes place in manufacturing. No
evidence for an overstatement of the elasticity change in the FDI
calculations is found.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper analyses the hypothesis that the liberalisation of foreign
direct investment has made labour costs more important to domestic
investment. Using a very simplified model of the multinational
corporation, the paper demonstrates that falling FDI barriers will
tend to make the effect of unit costs on domestic production more
negative. By way of evidence, it first shows that unit labour costs
have a substantial positive effect on bilateral FDI flows. The results
suggest that FDI liberalisation has considerably increased the
investment elasticity in both Britain and Germany. In turn, this
implies that the long-run labour demand elasticity may also have
risen substantially. Then, the paper tests directly whether the effect
of unit labour costs on domestic investment has changed between
the 1970s and 1980s, a time when FDI grew substantially. And
indeed, the long-run elasticity of manufacturing investment with
18
respect to unit labour costs seems to have risen substantially,
particularly in Germany. This change is especially clear in those
industries where FDI plays an important role.
What are the implications of a flatter labour demand curve,
whether brought about by trade or FDI liberalisation? Clearly,
workers’ bargaining power will be reduced, an effect which may be
partly responsible for at least some of the problems experienced by
the British – and to a lesser extent German – trade union movement
over the last 20 years. In a general equilibrium setting, Wes (1996)
shows that a flatter labour demand curve leads to lower aggregate
unemployment as the markup of bargained wages over prices falls.
However, it is important to note the underlying assumption that
wage-setters have adjusted fully to the new labour demand
environment. If wage-setting behaviour takes time to adjust, a
transition phase of higher unemployment may result. Quite possibly,
we are currently witnessing such a high-unemployment transition
phase in both countries. It is probably too early to say whether the
recent fall in British unemployment indicates that the transition
phase is coming to an end.
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ENDNOTES
1 Whether this assumption is justified is subject to debate.
Graham (1995) argues that in general FDI should be viewed as a
source of funds and not a use of funds. He finds that in the case of
US-owned foreign subsidiaries, the short-run effect of FDI flows on
the subsidiary’s fixed investment is significantly positive, but less
than unity. Using aggregate FDI flows for all OECD countries, by
contrast, Feldstein (1995) finds that net FDI outflows translate
straight into lower domestic investment in the long-run, and he
cannot reject a one-for-one relationship. The robustness of
Feldstein’s findings is challenged by Devereux (1996).
2 Similar equations have recently been estimated by Cushman
(1987), Culem (1988), Lucas (1993), Moore (1993), Pain (1993),
Klein and Rosengren (1994), Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero
(1994), Barrell and Pain (1996), and Wang and Swain (1996).
While the effects are not always significant, most find that higher
(unit) labour costs increase outward or reduce inward FDI.
3 In preliminary work, I found standard wage-setting or labour
supply variables such as strikes and lockouts or participation rates to
be poor instruments for unit labour costs in my time-series cross-
section framework. Note that Cushman (1987) finds little evidence
for simultaneity of labour costs, exchange rates, and American FDI
flows.
4 In particular, there is no evidence that EC membership is
important for the determination of FDI flows. Note, however, that
this does not rule out the kind of positive effect of British EC
membership on FDI inflows that is often assumed in the British
public debate.
5 In a static model, the LSDV estimator is unbiased and efficient
under classical assumptions. In a dynamic model, the autoregressive
is biased downwards for finite T (see Nickell, 1981). However,
recent simulation studies by Harris and Matyas (1996) and Judson
and Owen (1996) find that the estimates on the X variables, in which
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I am most interested, are very good in terms of small-sample bias and
efficiency. Under a sample design similar to mine, moreover, Harris
and Matyas (1996) find that the small-sample performance of the
lagged dependent variable estimates is at least as good as that of the
most popular instrumental-variable alternatives, which typically
perform poorly with a small cross-sectional dimension. Note also
that none of my manufacturing investment equations shows signs of
residual autocorrelation, as required for consistency.
6 No labour cost data are available for Portugal in 1992 and 93;
they are extrapolated using manufacturing earnings growth published
in the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators.
7 Only current-price value-added is available for Spain and New
Zealand; it is divided by the GDP deflator to obtain constant-price
figures.
8 Belgium and Luxembourg, which are consolidated in the
OECD statistics, are excluded because flows to Luxembourg are
likely to be dominated by subsidiaries of German banks. Many of
these were set up in response to the German withholding tax on
capital income.
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TABLE 1
FDI and Relative Unit Labour Costs: Britain
Outflows Inflows ULC
Australia 1.098% n. a. +0.161
Belgium 0.348% 0.135% +0.041
Canada 0.660% 0.105% +0.001
Denmark 0.111% 0.483% -0.284
France 0.148% 0.190% +0.029
Germany 0.079% 0.063% -0.088
Italy 0.127% n. a. +0.337
Japan 0.007% 0.025% +0.096
Netherlands 0.823% 0.434% -0.033
New Zealand 0.582% n. a. +0.335
Portugal 0.653% n. a. +0.996
Spain 0.190% n. a. +0.499
Sweden 0.077% 0.637% -0.314
US 0.458% 0.200% +0.028
Note: The FDI data refer to manufacturing average real annual
flows between 1979 and 1993 in volume terms and scale
the flow by the partner country’s real value added in
manufacturing. Outflows are from the UK. The unit labour
cost (ULC) data refer to the UK’s average log
manufacturing ULC in a common currency minus that of the
partner country.
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TABLE 2
FDI and Relative Unit Labour Costs: Germany
Outflows Inflows Outward
stock
change
Inward
stock
change
ULC
Australia 0.037% 0.002% 0.110% 0.004% +0.216
Austria 0.411% 0.094% 0.702% 0.349% +0.029
Canada 0.062% 0.008% 0.074% 0.029% +0.063
Denmark 0.053% 0.042% 0.099% 0.157% -0.091
France 0.100% 0.047% 0.141% 0.071% +0.128
Ireland 1.774% 0.034% 3.621% 0.000% +0.143
Italy 0.074% 0.010% 0.168% 0.021% +0.424
Japan 0.006% 0.017% 0.007% 0.034% -0.153
Netherlands 0.369% 0.108% 0.345% 0.868% +0.082
Portugal 0.183% 0.000% 1.089% 0.002% +0.921
Spain 0.176% 0.006% 0.285% -0.003% +0.527
Sweden 0.062% 0.075% 0.142% 0.248% -0.207
Switzerland 0.292% 0.007% 0.297% 0.669% -0.301
UK 0.149% 0.029% 0.232% 0.058% +0.185
US 0.063% -0.002% 0.074% 0.020% +0.009
Note: The FDI data refer to average real annual flows between
1982 (stock changes: 1984) and 1993 in volume terms and
scale the flow by the partner country’s real GDP. Outflows
and outward stock changes are from Germany. The unit
labour cost (ULC) data refer to Germany’s average log total
ULC in a common currency minus that of the partner
country.
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TABLE 3
Foreign Investment, Britain
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RULC 0.376*
(0.138)
0.545*
(0.168)
0.625*
(0.235)
0.543*
(0.169)
0.590*
(0.176)
0.297
(0.238)
0.289
(0.241)
0.279
(0.251)
EC - - 0.212
(0.323)
- - - - -
RULC*EC - - -0.119
(0.315)
- - - - -
Demand index
source
- - - -0.078
(1.246)
-0.188
(1.250)
- -0.187
(1.243)
-0.175
(1.253)
Demand index
destin.
- - - 0.107
(0.890)
0.287
(0.899)
- 0.126
(0.881)
0.169
(0.896)
Relative days
lost
- - - - -0.048
(0.042)
- - -0.026
(0.048)
Relative real
interest rate
- - - - -1.311
(1.077)
- - -0.026
(1.230)
Dummies:
Country no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bilateral no no no no no yes yes yes
Time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.206 0.202 0.201 0.200 0.225 0.220 0.216
N 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342
Note: All equations include a constant. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. The sample period is 1979-93. The symbol * indicates
significance at the five percent level.
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TABLE 4
Foreign Investment, Germany (flow data)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RULC - 0.157
(0.091)
- - - - - -
EC 1.087
(0.652)
- -0.068
(0.194)
-0.067
(0.197)
-0.067
(0.195)
-0.068
(0.184)
-0.067
(0.186)
-0.067
(0.186)
RULC*EC 0.295*
(0.127)
- 0.295*
(0.123)
0.297*
(0.123)
0.335*
(0.140)
0.362
(0.359)
0.376
(0.360)
0.383
(0.362)
RULC
*(1-EC)
-0.009
(0.139)
- -0.001
(0.135)
-0.001
(0.135)
0.081
(0.140)
0.160
(0.277)
0.169
(0.278)
0.315
(0.293)
Demand index
source
- - - -0.668
(2.012)
-1.110
(2.006)
- -0.752
(1.902)
-1.103
(1.913)
Demand index
destin.
- - - 0.759
(2.012)
1.201
(2.006)
- 0.842
(1.902)
1.194
(1.913)
Relative days
lost
- - - - 0.052
(0.042)
- - 0.030
(0.058)
Relative real
interest rate
- - - - -2.689*
(1.124)
- - -2.423
(1.678)
Dummies:
Country no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bilateral no no no no no yes yes yes
Time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.088 0.091 0.087 0.100 0.188 0.184 0.186
N 358 358 358 358 358 358 358 358
Note: All equations include a constant. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. The sample period is 1982-93. The symbol * indicates
significance at the five percent level.
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TABLE 5
Foreign Investment, Germany (differenced stock data)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RULC - 0.523*
(0.154)
- - - - - -
EC 0.206
(0.112)
- 0.012
(0.387)
0.001
(0.387)
0.001
(0.380)
0.012
(0.356)
0.001
(0.356)
0.001
(0.354)
RULC*EC 0.698*
(0.207)
- 0.698*
(0.196)
0.698*
(0.196)
0.816*
(0.221)
0.517
(0.621)
0.534
(0.623)
0.865
(0.638)
RULC
*(1-EC)
0.241
(0.263)
- 0.241
(0.249)
0.243
(0.250)
0.339
(0.253)
0.098
(0.465)
0.118
(0.467)
0.544
(0.509)
Demand
index source
- - - 3.570
(3.535)
2.222
(3.507)
- 3.035
(3.267)
1.722
(3.310)
Demand
index destin.
- - - 3.905
(3.535)
5.254
(3.507)
- 4.441
(3.267)
5.754
(3.310)
Relative days
lost
- - - - 0.201
(0.093)
- - 0.162
(0.125)
Relative real
interest rate
- - - - -7.063*
(2.127)
- - -5.581
(3.112)
Dummies:
Country no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bilateral no no no no no yes yes yes
Time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.167 0.167 0.166 0.198 0.294 0.294 0.302
N 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298
Note: All equations include a constant. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. The sample period is 1984-93. The symbol * indicates
significance at the 5% level.
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TABLE 6
Average Industry Investment Rates and Unit Labour Costs,
1970-80 and 1981-91
Industry Investment rate Unit labour costs
Britain Germany Britain Germany
Food (3110/3120) 0.098 0.164 0.438 0.586
Beverages (3130) 0.178 0.215 0.298 0.421
Tobacco (3140) 0.041 0.024 0.292 0.098
Textiles (3210) 0.130 0.145 0.896 0.688
Wearing apparel (3220) 0.065 0.050 0.923 0.758
Leather and products (3230) 0.063 0.075 0.848 0.642
Footwear (3240) 0.039 0.064 0.943 0.799
Wood products (3310) 0.105 0.145 0.619 0.681
Furniture and fixtures (3320) 0.056 0.083 0.684 0.760
Paper products (3410) 0.145 0.176 0.862 0.597
Printing, publishing (3420) 0.073 0.134 0.861 0.812
Industrial chemicals (3510) 0.334 0.247 0.726 0.559
Other chemicals (3520) 0.129 0.126 0.679 0.601
Petroleum refineries (3530) 0.269 0.066 0.267 0.111
Petroleum, coal prod. (3540) 0.095 - 0.725 -
Rubber products (3550) 0.110 0.149 1.044 0.914
Plastic products (3560) 0.133 0.184 0.968 0.833
Pottery and china (3610) 0.102 0.137 1.019 1.047
Glass and products (3620) 0.319 0.241 0.933 0.692
Non-metallic products (3690) 0.132 0.176 0.686 0.559
Iron and steel (3710) 0.233 0.179 0.956 0.761
Non-ferrous metals (3720) 0.216 0.128 0.841 0.706
Metal products (3810) 0.107 0.114 0.902 0.698
Non-electr. machinery (3820) 0.089 0.094 0.912 0.807
Electrical machinery (3830) 0.106 0.118 0.891 0.763
Transport equipment (3840) 0.114 0.139 0.963 0.752
Professional goods (3850) 0.273 0.169 0.791 0.683
Total manufacturing 0.139 0.136 0.777 0.666
Note: The investment rate is defined as gross capital formation over value
added. Real unit labour costs are annual labour costs over value
added.
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TABLE 7
Log Industry Investment, Britain (All Industries)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
    1970-1980 1981-1991
Log inv. (t-1) 0.524***
(0.053)
0.527***
(0.057)
0.449***
(0.044)
0.527***
(0.049)
ULC 0.151
(0.118)
0.284**
(0.119)
-0.084
(0.146)
-0.046
(0.166)
ULC (t-1) -0.404***
(0.118)
-0.383***
(0.119)
-0.245
(0.149)
-0.459***
(0.159)
Demand 0.995***
(0.229)
0.423
(0.317)
1.706***
(0.157)
1.802***
(0.273)
Sum ULC -0.253* -0.099 -0.329** -0.505***
Fixed effects:
Industry yes yes yes yes
Time no yes no yes
Adjusted R2 0.970 0.977 0.978 0.978
N 270 270 297 297
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. “Sum ULC”
denotes the sum of the current and lagged unit labour cost
coefficients. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the ten, five, and one percent level,
respectively.
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TABLE 8
Log Industry Investment, Germany (All Industries)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
1970-1980 1981-1991
Log inv. (t-1) 0.656***
(0.043)
0.621***
(0.056)
0.757***
(0.042)
0.650***
(0.049)
ULC -0.052
(0.133)
-0.053
(0.135)
-0.443***
(0.191)
-0.203
(0.197)
ULC (t-1) 0.123
(0.115)
0.102
(0.115)
-0.631***
(0.213)
-0.614***
(0.213)
Demand 0.700***
(0.223)
0.410
(0.282)
1.104***
(0.239)
0.865***
(0.260)
Sum ULC 0.071 0.049 -1.074*** -0.817***
Fixed effects:
Industry yes yes yes yes
Time no yes no yes
Adjusted R2 0.981 0.983 0.988 0.990
N 260 260 260 260
Note: See note for Table 7
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TABLE 9
Log Industry Investment, Britain (Low-FDI Industries)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
1970-1980 1981-1991
Log inv. (t-1) 0.422***
(0.076)
0.490***
(0.081)
0.325***
(0.061)
0.426***
(0.075)
ULC -0.117
(0.229)
0.107
(0.249)
-0.046
(0.238)
0.096
(0.268)
ULC (t-1) -0.688***
(0.222)
-0.716***
(0.227)
-0.320
(0.243)
-0.593**
(0.253)
Demand 1.134***
(0.295)
0.130
(0.442)
1.884***
(0.187)
1.996***
(0.454)
Sum ULC -0.805*** -0.609** -0.366 -0.497*
Fixed effects:
Industry yes yes yes yes
Time no yes no yes
Adjusted R2 0.974 0.977 0.975 0.977
N 140 140 154 154
Note: See note for Table 7
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TABLE 10
Log Industry Investment, Germany (Low-FDI Industries)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
1970-1980 1981-1991
Log inv. (t-1) 0.392***
(0.115)
0.373***
(0.133)
0.723***
(0.091)
0.523***
(0.118)
ULC -0.590
(0.380)
-0.793**
(0.310)
-1.310**
(0.584)
-0.472
(0.543)
ULC (t-1) 0.155
(0.344)
0.126
(0.301)
-1.411**
(0.641)
-0.093
(0.612)
Demand 1.536***
(0.480)
0.660
(0.526)
1.218**
(0.622)
0.927
(0.648)
Sum ULC -0.445 -0.667** -2.721*** -0.569
Fixed effects:
Industry yes yes yes yes
Time no yes no yes
Adjusted R2 0.954 0.974 0.964 0.976
N 70 70 77 77
Note: See note for Table 7
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TABLE 11
Log Industry Investment, Britain (Medium-FDI Industries)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
1970-1980 1981-1991
Log inv. (t-1) 0.540***
(0.107)
0.265*
(0.156)
0.550***
(0.111)
0.635***
(0.117)
ULC -0.805***
(0.296)
-0.028
(0.295)
0.220
(0.451)
0.212
(0.679)
ULC (t-1) 0.295
(0.239)
0.389
(0.278)
-0.637
(0.556)
-1.318*
(0.763)
Demand 2.202***
(0.358)
0.688*
(0.361)
1.885***
(0.528)
0.930
(0.884)
Sum ULC -0.510* 0.361 -0.417 -1.106*
Fixed effects:
Industry yes yes yes yes
Time no yes no yes
Adjusted R2 0.961 0.984 0.875 0.910
N 40 40 44 44
Note: See note for Table 7
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TABLE 12
Log Investment, Germany (Medium-FDI Industries)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
1970-1980 1981-1991
Log inv. (t-1) 0.752***
(0.069)
0.659***
(0.097)
0.694***
(0.073)
0.527***
(0.091)
ULC -0.054
(0.264)
-0.124
(0.304)
0.115
(0.363)
0.310
(0.360)
ULC (t-1) 0.165
(0.242)
0.338
(0.277)
-0.752**
(0.378)
-0.529
(0.368)
Demand 1.110***
(0.431)
0.941*
(0.591)
1.733***
(0.378)
1.045*
(0.567)
Sum ULC 0.111 0.214 -0.637** -0.219
Fixed effects:
Industry yes yes yes yes
Time no yes no yes
Adjusted R2 0.965 0.967 0.978 0.982
N 90 90 99 99
Note: See note for Table 7
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TABLE 13
Log Industry Investment, Britain (High-FDI Industries)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
1970-1980 1981-1991
Log inv. (t-1) 0.564***
(0.096)
0.518***
(0.112)
0.574***
(0.081)
0.609***
(0.085)
ULC 0.302*
(0.163)
0.364**
(0.160)
-0.242
(0.229)
-0.245
(0.264)
ULC (t-1) -0.378**
(0.177)
-0.382**
(0.181)
-0.177
(0.225)
-0.297
(0.253)
Demand 0.574
(0.499)
0.477
(0.707)
1.319***
(0.371)
1.725***
(0.506)
Sum ULC -0.076 -0.018 -0.419* -0.542**
Fixed effects:
Industry yes yes yes yes
Time no yes no yes
Adjusted R2 0.956 0.961 0.969 0.978
N 90 90 99 99
Note:  See note for Table 7
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TABLE 14
Log Industry Investment, Germany (High-FDI Industries)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
1970-1980 1981-1991
Log inv. (t-1) 0.607***
(0.072) 0.602****
(0.092)
0.727***
(0.063)
0.722***
(0.061)
ULC -0.034
(0.179)
-0.095
(0.180)
-0.532**
(0.221)
-0.325
(0.217)
ULC (t-1) 0.113
(0.144)
0.028
(0.141)
-0.476*
(0.259)
-0.742***
(0.250)
Demand 0.374
(0.337)
0.450
(0.392)
0.922***
(0.276)
0.591**
(0.278)
Sum ULC 0.079 -0.067 -1.008*** -1.076***
Fixed effects:
Industry yes yes yes yes
Time no yes no yes
Adjusted R2 0.989 0.991 0.995 0.996
N 100 100 110 110
Note: See note for Table 7
35
FIGURE 1
A Fall in Average FDI Barriers
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FIGURE 2
Real FDI Outflows and Changes in Outward FDI Stocks, Germany
Real Outflows and Changes in Outward FDI Stocks, Germany, 1982 to 1993
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FIGURE 3
Real FDI Inflows and Changes in Inward FDI Stocks, Germany
Real Inflows and Changes in Inward FDI Stocks, Germany 1982 to 1993
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THEORETICAL APPENDIX
Assume that countries h and f each have a large number of firms that
produce under constant returns to scale and sell their products in
both countries. Sales in each market are given, production is
Leontief, technology is identical across countries, and capital is
bought at a constant price and then deployed wherever production is
to take place. However, both wages and worker effectiveness differ
between countries. Under these conditions, unit labour costs, ch and
cf, are sufficient to describe the relative costs of production in
different countries.
Firms incur a trade cost of t per unit of output whenever the
good is produced in a country different from that of final sale.
Moreover, a firm that produces outside its home country incurs a
firm-specific “FDI cost” of f , which is normally distributed with
expectation m  and variance s 2 .
The four conditions that indicate whether an h or f firm,
respectively, that sells in market h or f, respectively, will produce in
country h, are obtained by adding the three cost components
described above. Assume for convenience that firms will produce in
h if total costs are less than or equal to costs in f. An h firm selling in
h will produce in h as long as c c th f- £ + f , while an h firm selling
in f will produce in h if c c th f- £ - + f . Equivalent conditions hold
for country f firms. Together with the distributional assumptions
about f , this implies that the proportion of country h firms that
carry out their production for market h in country h is given by
q
m
shhh SN
h fF
c c t
=
- + + +é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú ,
where FSN [.] refers to the standard normal cumulative distribution
function. Falling FDI barriers are modelled as a fall in m , which
raises the proportion of h firms that move production to f; if ch
exceeds cf initially, so that more h firms produce in f than vice versa,
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such a fall causes a net reduction in country h labour demand.
Likewise, a rise in ch raises the proportion of h firms that move
production to f and lowers the proportion of f firms that move
production to h; this obviously lowers labour demand in h. Similar
relationships hold for the other three cases.
A more interesting question is how the effect of labour costs on
domestic labour demand changes as the barriers to FDI fall. A
sufficient condition for the cross-partial derivative of qhhh  with
respect to labour costs and average FDI barriers to be negative is that
qhhh  exceeds one-half initially, so that a firm with f m=  produces in
h. In this case, lower FDI barriers will always make the effect of
higher domestic labour costs on domestic labour demand more
negative. Similar results hold for the other three cases, namely h
firms producing for market f, and f firms producing for markets h and
f. The effect of falling FDI barriers on the total labour demand effect
of labour costs is given by the sum of all four second derivatives. A
sufficient condition for this sum to be negative is that qhfh  and q fhf
both exceed one-half or – assuming constant firm size – each
country exports more than its foreign subsidiaries produce for the
foreign market.
In Figure 1, which depicts the case of a home firm producing
for the home market, production will take place abroad whenever
f < - -c c th f . A fall in average FDI barriers from m1  to m2  shifts the
distribution of f  leftwards, which increases both the total
proportion of output produced abroad and its marginal change as
labour costs in either country change.
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DATA APPENDIX
FDI equations
The British FDI data refer to two-way manufacturing flows between
Britain and other OECD countries for the period 1978 to 1993 as
published by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) in Business
Monitor MA4. The sample consists of two-way flows between the
UK and Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Canada, the US, Australia, and Japan; in addition, the
sample includes outflows from the UK to Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Australia, and New Zealand. The UK inflow series were deflated by
the UK capital formation deflator (OECD: National Accounts). The
outflow series were converted into host-country currency using
market exchange rates, deflated by the host-country gross capital
formation deflator, and reconverted into pounds sterling at
purchasing power parity to obtain FDI volume series. They were
then expressed as a percentage of the partner country’s GDP. The
other explanatory variables for both the foreign and domestic
investment equations are mainly taken from the OECD’s STAN
database. The labour cost variable refers to annual total labour
compensation per worker. It is adjusted by the GDP deflator (a
manufacturing value-added deflator is not available for all
countries).vi The productivity variable is constant-price value added
divided by the number of employees.vii All other variables are taken
from the CEP-OECD data set described in Bell and Dryden (1996).
The German FDI data are constructed in a similar manner but
use aggregate data. Two alternative measures are employed for the
numerator. First, “FDI flows” represent two-way flows between
Germany (until 1990: West Germany) and other OECD countries for
the period 1982 to 1993 as published by the OECD in its
International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbooks 1993 to 1995.
Second, “FDI stock differences” refer to the first difference of real
German inward and outward FDI stocks vis-à-vis other OECD
countries for the period 1984 to 1993. The sample is made up of
two-way FDI between Germany and Australia, Austria, Canada,
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Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. Within the OECD,
these are the most important FDI partner countries for Germany.viii
Inflows and outflows are pooled. All other variables are taken from
the CEP-OECD data set.
Domestic Investment Equations
For both countries, all variables in the domestic manufacturing
investment equations are taken from the OECD’s STAN data base.
The number of industries is 26, while the sample period is from 1970
to 1991. The variable definitions are generally similar to the FDI
equations. Investment is defined as the logarithm of real investment
deflated by the capital goods price deflator. Unit labour costs are
defined as log real annual labour costs, deflated by the industry
value-added deflator, minus log productivity, where log productivity
is the predicted value from an industry-specific cubic trend in log
value-added per worker. Finally, demand is defined as the deviation
of log real industry output from a cubic trend.
For Britain, FDI intensity is defined as the 1984-93 average of
inward plus outward FDI flows (OECD, 1995) divided by gross
domestic capital formation (STAN). Whenever this ratio (whose
aggregate value is 0.72) exceeds 0.4 (1.1), the industry is classified
as medium-FDI (high-FDI). As the CSO uses a different industrial
classifications from the OECD, all industries except ISIC group 38
(metal and engineering industries), where three-digit information is
available, were classified according to their two-digit FDI intensity.
Moreover, there is no information on FDI in ISIC groups 33 and 36;
the classification of these industries as low-FDI is based on German
FDI data taken from Deutsche Bundesbank (1995). ISIC codes 341,
342, 382, 383 are classified as medium-FDI. ISIC codes 311/312,
313, 314, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356 are high-FDI.
In Germany, the industries are classified according to their FDI
intensity by dividing the 1991 inward plus outward FDI stock
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995), which is available at a higher level of
industrial disaggregation than the flow data, by 1991 gross domestic
capital formation (STAN). Whenever this ratio (whose aggregate
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value is 1.25) exceeds 0.6 (2.0), the industry is classified as medium-
FDI (high-FDI). As the industrial classifications differ, the results are
only approximate and ISIC groups 311/2/3, 323/4, 351/2, 353/4,
and 361/2/9 had to be aggregated. ISIC groups: 321, 322, 356, 361,
362, 369, 371, 372, 385 are classified as medium-FDI. ISIC groups
314, 323, 324, 351, 352, 353, 355, 382, 383, 384 are classified as
high-FDI.
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ENDNOTES
                                                            
i Whether this assumption is justified is subject to debate.
Graham (1995) argues that in general FDI should be viewed as a
source of funds and not a use of funds. He finds that in the case of
US-owned foreign subsidiaries, the short-run effect of FDI flows on
the subsidiary’s fixed investment is significantly positive, but less
than unity. Using aggregate FDI flows for all OECD countries, by
contrast, Feldstein (1995) finds that net FDI outflows translate
straight into lower domestic investment in the long-run, and he
cannot reject a one-for-one relationship. The robustness of
Feldstein’s findings is challenged by Devereux (1996).
ii Similar equations have recently been estimated by Cushman
(1987), Culem (1988), Lucas (1993), Moore (1993), Pain (1993),
Klein and Rosengren (1994), Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero
(1994), Barrell and Pain (1996), and Wang and Swain (1996).
While the effects are not always significant, most find that higher
(unit) labour costs increase outward or reduce inward FDI.
iii In preliminary work, I found standard wage-setting or labour
supply variables such as strikes and lockouts or participation rates to
be poor instruments for unit labour costs in my time-series cross-
section framework. Note that Cushman (1987) finds little evidence
for simultaneity of labour costs, exchange rates, and American FDI
flows.
iv In particular, there is no evidence that EC membership is
important for the determination of FDI flows. Note, however, that
this does not rule out the kind of positive effect of British EC
membership on FDI inflows that is often assumed in the British
public debate.
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v In a static model, the LSDV estimator is unbiased and efficient
under classical assumptions. In a dynamic model, the autoregressive
is biased downwards for finite T (see Nickell, 1981). However,
recent simulation studies by Harris and Matyas (1996) and Judson
and Owen (1996) find that the estimates on the X variables, in which
I am most interested, are very good in terms of small-sample bias and
efficiency. Under a sample design similar to mine, moreover, Harris
and Matyas (1996) find that the small-sample performance of the
lagged dependent variable estimates is at least as good as that of the
most popular instrumental-variable alternatives, which typically
perform poorly with a small cross-sectional dimension. Note also
that none of my manufacturing investment equations shows signs of
residual autocorrelation, as required for consistency.
vi No labour cost data are available for Portugal in 1992 and 93;
they are extrapolated using manufacturing earnings growth published
in the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators.
vii Only current-price value-added is available for Spain and New
Zealand; it is divided by the GDP deflator to obtain constant-price
figures.
viii Belgium and Luxembourg, which are consolidated in the
OECD statistics, are excluded because flows to Luxembourg are
likely to be dominated by subsidiaries of German banks. Many of
these were set up in response to the German withholding tax on
capital income.
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